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Abstract 
Recent research shows that food standards can be heterogeneous 
across sectors or countries: they sometimes act as barriers to trade, but 
in other cases may lead to increased trade. We present empirical evi-
dence from Norwegian seafood export data showing that food stand-
ards, measured by SPS and TBT notifications, generally have a negative 
impact on total exports, the number of exporters and their average ex-
ports. However, for fresh seafood, the impact of SPSs is positive. We 
present a theoretical explanation for this, suggesting that food stand-
ards reduce consumer uncertainty about quality and safety and there-
fore increase demand. 
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 1. Introduction 
According to the WTO (2012), international food trade is characterised 
by the growing importance of non-tariff measures (NTMs) like sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures or technical barriers to trade (TBT) 
related to health or food quality. Using recent, precise data collected for 
two dozen countries, Gourdon and Nicita (2012) found that 60 per cent 
of trade in food-related products was affected by SPS measures. At 
times, food standards can act as severe trade barriers. With some inspi-
ration from early literature such as Deardorff and St¬¬ern (1998) and 
international data collection exercises, efforts were made to estimate 
the tariff equivalents of NTMs, see e.g. Kee et al. (2009). This contribut-
ed to consolidating a ‘standards-as-barriers’ approach to SPS and TBT, 
where NTMs are technically considered as resembling tariffs. From the 
outset, however, it has been recognised that standards are not neces-
sarily introduced for protectionist purposes: food standards may be 
good for health, and in some cases there may be a welfare gain even if 
trade is reduced (Disdier and Marette, 2010).  Hence there is a cost–
benefit aspect to standards that has to be accounted for.  
Contrary to the standards-as-barriers perception, some authors have 
argued that standards may sometimes promote trade.  
One possibility is that there is a direct demand enchancing effect: There 
may be asymmetric information in the Akerlof sense, whereby consum-
ers have less information about product quality than do the producers. 
In this situation, standards may reveal the quality of products and 
thereby directly increase demand. Leland (1979) examined the impact 
of food standards in one market and concluded that minimum stand-
ards could in many situations boost sales and raise welfare. In the con-
text of international trade, this argument was presented by Thilmany 
and Barrett (1997), who argued that we cannot be sure whether food 
standards reduce or increase trade.  If consumers care not only about 
the quality of products but also about aspects of the production pro-
cess, such as labour rights or environmental issues, this creates anoth-
er channel whereby compliance with standards may promote trade. For 
example, Teisl et al. (2002) found that eco-labels signalling that no 
dolphins were killed during tuna fishing increased demand for canned 
tuna in the USA. 
Another possibility is that there is a trade distortion effect: In the con-
text of international trade, countries may differ in their capacity to 
comply with foreign standard requirements (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). 
Such requirements may therefore create competitive advantage in 
countries that invest in capacity to meet them. Casella (1996) holds 
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that standards requirements vary across countries and that they should 
do so, due to differing preferences or levels of development. A concern 
may be that rich countries are better able to adapt to strict standards 
and can thereby obtain competitive advantages. Some case studies (e.g. 
Wei et al., 2012) have shown that developed-country food standards 
act as a barrier to developing-country exports.  This has also been sup-
ported by econometric studies; for instance, Disdier et al. (2008) found 
that intra-OECD agricultural trade was not impeded by SPS and TBT, 
whereas developing country exports to the OECD were indeed affected.  
In the recent literature on NTMs and food standards, therefore, the 
‘standards-as-barriers’ perception is gradually challenged by the ‘two 
faces of standards’ approach. Thus, even if there is a cost involved in 
complying with standards, the trade-enhancing effects may be even 
larger. This is exactly what was found by Xiong and Beghin (2014), 
who distinguished between the trade-reducing and trade-enhancing 
effect of standards. The trade-reducing impact was greater for develop-
ing-country exports, while the demand-growth effect was stronger for 
exports from developed countries. Mangelsdorf et al. (2012) found that 
Chinese food standards promoted Chinese food exports. In this paper 
we present a theoretical foundation for the ‘two faces of standards’- 
hypothesis by slightly modifying the Melitz (2003)/Chaney (2008) het-
erogeneous-firms trade model. We let trade costs consist of different 
parts where some capture the costs of compliance with a standard, and 
we include a mechanism whereby demand may respond positively to 
the imposition of a standard. 
The ambiguous trade impact of standards is also illustrated by the fact 
that the impact of NTMs appears to differ across subsectors in interna-
tional food trade. Disdier et al. (2008) found that even if NTMs on the 
whole can be said to have a trade-reducing impact, there was a statisti-
cally significant trade-enhancing effect for many sectors. When the 
impact of NTMs was estimated separately for 30 subsectors of agricul-
tural trade, the impact was found to be significantly negative (trade-
reducing) for nine sectors, and significantly positive (trade-enhancing) 
for eight sectors (ibid., p. 346).  
Some evidence indicates that NTMs are particularly prevalent for sea-
food. For example, Jaud et al. (2012, p. 131) found that for SPS sani-
tary risk alerts in the EU during 2001–2005, 23 per cent concerned 
unprocessed fish and seafood alone. Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) 
found that NTMs covered a large share of seafood trade, but there were 
few trade frictions or concerns. The number of notified NTMs was high 
for processed seafood but low for other fish and seafood. Shepotylo 
(2015) explored SPS and TBT notifications on seafood among WTO 
members and showed that SPSs affected 15.4 per cent of all possible 
bilateral seafood exports, while TBTs affected 3.1 per cent. Whereas 
SPSs were more common for live and fresh products, the opposite was 
true for TBTs.   This high incidence of NTMs for seafood and the fact 
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that seafood products are an important subset of international food 
trade, representing about 10 per cent of global food trade, motivates 
further study of international trade in seafood.   
In this paper we study the impact of food standards in a panel of firm-
level data for seafood export from a highly developed country, namely 
Norway. We focus on effects for different subgroups of products. Nor-
way is currently the world’s second-largest exporter of seafood, with a 
share of 9 per cent of world exports in 2010–2012. For Norwegian sea-
food exports, some earlier survey evidence revealed that adaptation to 
foreign standards was a very important part of export costs, and ex-
porters expressed very strong interest in international harmonization of 
standards (Medin and Melchior, 2002). For about 20 countries, with 
the USA, Russia and Brazil on top, the exporting firms had experienced 
that veterinary standards had hindered exports (ibid., p. 61). More re-
cently for Russia, Norwegian salmon exports and later other seafood 
products were subject to a more restrictive SPS regime (Holm and 
Kokkvold, 2007).  Another case is China, where extended veterinary 
inspections were introduced after the controversial Norwegian award of 
the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident in 2010 (Chen and Garcia, 
2015).  
Following the recent literature on trade with firm heterogeneity (initiat-
ed by Melitz, 2003), an important distinction is made in this paper be-
tween the extensive and intensive margins of trade, where the former 
captures the number of exporters or changes in export due to exit and 
entry, and the latter captures average export value or changes for al-
ready-established trade flows.  In this way we attempt to distinguish 
changes in export due to fixed compliance costs from those due to vari-
able compliance costs. Shepotylo’s (2015) analysis of international 
seafood trade with aggregate data finds that SPSs increase the exten-
sive and reduce the intensive margin trade, whereas the converse holds 
for TBTs. He also finds considerable heterogeneity in responses across 
products.   
We present descriptive evidence showing that firms already exporting a 
given product to a given country accounted for the major changes in 
Norwegian seafood export. There are also considerable changes due to 
entry and exit, but these almost cancel out, so the net impact is modest. 
In an econometric analysis we focus on how Norwegian exports of dif-
ferent products to different countries are affected by NTM measures 
imposed by the importing countries. Using data on WTO notifications 
of SPSs and TBTs, we find that on average for all products, SPSs have a 
significant trade-reducing effect. The effect is negative for the number 
of exporters as well as for their average exports, suggesting that com-
pliance costs are mainly variable, not fixed. Although the effects are 
negative when averaged over all products, there are strong differences 
across subsectors: for fresh seafood products, the effects are positive.  
This study therefore adds to the literature suggesting that the impact of 
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NTMs on trade varies across products, and NTMs in general cannot be 
seen as trade-reducing tariff-equivalents.  
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 
the empirical evidence, while section 4 sums up the results and sug-
gests that further research and better data are needed to draw more 
firm conclusions about the exact underlying mechanisms for our re-
sults.  
 2. Food standards, firm hetero-
geneity and the extensive and in-
tensive margins of trade 
Here we present a slightly modified version of the Melitz (2003)/ 
Chaney (2008) model. As opposed to that model, both variable and 
fixed trade costs contain elements reflecting the costs of compliance 
with food standards. Furthermore, demand may increase as a conse-
quence of such compliance. This provides a theoretical foundation for 
the ‘two faces of standards’-hypothesis, and we examine under which 
circumstances a standard will be trade-reducing and under which it 
will be trade-enhancing. We also separate the effect on total trade into 
the extensive margin (the number of firms that export a particular 
product to a particular country) and the intensive margin (their average 
exports). Comparing the two margins gives an indication of whether 
compliance costs are mainly variable or mainly fixed. 
2.1. The model setup 
We operate with a total number of M countries that trade with each 
other and a total number of S product groups (or sectors) in each coun-
try. An individual product group is denoted by s, where s=0 denotes a 
freely traded homogeneous product produced under constant returns 
to scale. We assume that parameters in the model are such that this 
product is produced in all countries, which assures that wages are 
equalised (we normalised them to 1). s>0 denotes groups of products 
that are differentiated and produced under increasing returns to scale. 
In country j there is an exogenous mass of s
jn firms, each producing a 
unique variety of a product belonging to group s. sjn is proportional to 
the country’s labour force and given by   
(1) s sj j jn a L  
Utility in country i, Ui, is given by a two-level function, where the 
upper level is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of all product groups, with 
expenditure share for a given group equal to
s
i ,
0
1
iS
s
i
s


 . For differ-
entiated product groups, there is a lower-level subutility function given 
by a CES aggregate with elasticity of substitution: σs>1. 
Trade barriers or trade facilitators?   9 
9 
 
(2)   
0
11
0
1 1 1
s
s
i ssi
j
s
s s
ji
SM M
s s s s
i ji ji ji
j s j
U x q x d


 


 

   
  
   
    
     
 
, 1sjiu   
 s sjix  denotes consumption of variety s . The first subscript (j) 
refers to the country of production and the second (i) to the country of 
consumption, while the superscript (s) refers to the product group. 
s
ji is the set of varieties from product group s produced in country j 
available for consumption in country i. s
jiq  is a quality-perception pa-
rameter related to food standards, and >1sjiq implies that consumers 
will demand more of products that comply with a food standard, either 
because the standard actually improves the quality and safety of the 
product, or because it reduces consumer uncertainty about it.1 
In the following, we focus on one differentiated sector, as the other 
differentiated sectors are analogous; hence we drop the superscript s. 
Production of a given variety ω in country j incurs constant marginal 
costs,  c  , which denotes the variable labour requirement for pro-
ducing one unit of the final product.  c   varies across firms and is 
randomly drawn from a probability distribution with density given 
by ( )jg c . Since varieties produced by firms with the same  c  are 
symmetric, it is sufficient to index firms by c , and we therefor disre-
gard ω in the following. 
There is a fixed labour requirement of supplying each country, equal 
for all firms and given by fji>0 (which also accrues in the home market). 
Selling abroad involves a variable trade cost of the iceberg type, equal 
for all firms and given by tji≥1. Unity indicates no costs, and tjj = 1.  
It is well-known that (2) gives the following demand faced by a firm:2 
(3) ji ji ji ix t p B
  
pji is the consumer-price, and Bi reflects demand parameters:  
                                                          
1  See e.g. Venables (1987) for a similar formulation of demand. 
2  See e.g. Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 120). Note that (5) denotes demand faced 
by the firm; thus, we have corrected for the fact that tji units of xji disappear in 
transport. 
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(4) 
1
i i
i
i
y
B
P 


  
iP is the ideal price index following from (2). Countries are consid-
ered small enough not to influence yi and 1iP

 of their trading part-
ners; thus Bi is considered exogenous.3 
Firms engage in monopolistic competition. Together with CES utility 
and iceberg trade costs this leads to the recognised fact that the con-
sumer-price of a given variety in country i will be a constant mark-up 
over marginal production costs, adjusted for variable trade costs and 
qji. Furthermore, in this type of models qji works in the exact opposite 
direction of tji (see Venables, 1987). 
(5) 
1
ji j
ji
ji
t c
p
q




 
The two types of trade costs each consist of two parts: 
(6) 
1ji ji
ji ji jit T
 


  
(7) 
1ji ji
ji ji jif F
 



 
jiT  and jiF  are, respectively, the variable and fixed costs of compli-
ance with a standard imposed by the importer. These are equal to or 
larger than 1, where unity indicates no such costs. ji and ji  capture 
all other trade costs (variable and fixed, respectively). The parameters 
ji / ji indicates the amount of the total trade cost that is due to com-
pliance costs.  
jiq  is given by: 
(8) 
ji ji
ji ji jiq T F
 

 
0
ji
   and 0ji  . Complying with a food standard increases de-
mand in the importing country as long as ji  and ji  are strictly posi-
                                                          
3  Chaney (2008) assumes a global distribution mechanism for firm profit ensuring 
that yi is proportional to Li. He further assumes that Pi is unaffected by tji and fji (see 
footnote 20 in ibid.). 
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tive. The higher the ji  and ji , the more demand increases when a 
standard is imposed (for a given level of compliance costs).  jiT  and 
jiF  can be viewed as costs of actual quality upgrades, e.g. by requiring 
firms to use better cooling arrangements when transporting their prod-
ucts. Alternatively, they can be viewed as investments in schemes that 
reduce uncertainty or improve the reputation and attractiveness of 
products: a better reputation may reduce the probability of being sub-
jected to costly and tedious border controls where there is a food 
standard. 
Using eq. (3), (5), (6) and (8) and rearranging, the export revenue of 
an individual firm can be expressed as: 
(9)  
 1
1
1
1
ji ji ji ji
ji ji ji ji ir T F c B

    



    
  
 
 
The elasticities of jir with respect to Tji and Fji are  
(10)     1jiT ji ji jiE r       
(11)    1jiF ji jiE r     
Firms may freely establish sales; thus, the highest-cost firm from 
country j selling in country i earns zero profits from those sales and 
sells least. We refer to this firm as the ‘cutoff exporter’, and its marginal 
cost, jic , defines the cutoff cost for sales from j to i. jic is found by set-
ting ( )ji ji jir c f  in eq. (9) and using eq. (7): 
(12) 
 
   
11 1
1 11 1
1
ji ji ji
jji ji
ji ji ji ji ji ic T F B
   
   

 

  

   

 
From eq. (12) we can find the elasticities of jic with respect to Tji and 
Fji: 4 
(13)  jiT ji ji jiE c     
                                                          
4  We implicitly assume that firms consider Tji and Fji as exogenous. Hence, firms do 
not choose values of these variables in order to upgrade the quality or reduce the 
uncertainty about their products. 
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(14)  
 
 
1
1ji
ji ji
F jiE c
  

 


 
The above model reduces to the Melitz (2003)/Chaney (2008) model 
if compliance costs (variable as well as fixed) are the only trade costs 
and standards have no effect on demand (i.e. 1ji ji   and 
0ji ji   ). In that model, the effects of imposing of a food standard 
on a firm’s export and the cutoff cost level are unambiguous. Here, 
however, the signs of eq. (10), (11), (13), and (14) are uncertain and 
depend upon the size of ji , ji , ji , and ji . To discuss the circum-
stances under which the expressions have a certain sign, we divide 
effects into cost and demand effects, further subdivided into two cases: 
variable and fixed compliance costs.  
The ‘cost effect’ refers to the fact that a food standard requires firms 
to bear compliance costs. It is captured by the parameters reflecting the 
amount of total trade costs that is due to such costs ( ji  in the case of 
variable compliance costs and ji in the case of fixed compliance 
costs). This effect is also present in the standard Melitz (2003)/Chaney 
(2008) model. Our introduction of the parameter qji and its link to com-
pliance costs, however, creates a demand effect not captured by that 
model. This ‘demand effect’ refers to the fact that the imposition of a 
food standard increases demand in the importing country, and it is 
captured by the parameters reflecting how much demand increases due 
to the food standard ( ji in the case of variable compliance costs and 
ji in the case of fixed compliance costs).  
The cost effect dominates when compliance costs constitute large 
parts of the total ( ji / ji  is large) and/or there is no or little increase 
in demand when a food standard is imposed ( ji / ji  is zero or small). 
In this case, imposition of a food standard leads to a decrease in the 
cutoff cost. This happens independently of whether compliance costs 
are variable or fixed (both eq. 13 and 14 are negative). The effect on a 
firm’s export, on the other hand, depends on the nature of compliance 
costs. For variable costs, export declines (eq. 10 is negative). For fixed 
costs, export will either not be affected (for 0ji   Fji is not part of eq. 
9, and eq. 11 is zero) or increase slightly (eq. 11 is slightly positive).  
The demand effect dominates when demand is sensitive to the im-
position of a food standard ( ji / ji is large) and/or compliance costs 
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constitute small parts of total trade costs ( ji / ji is small). In this case, 
it is not important whether compliance costs are variable or fixed. In 
both cases, the imposition of a food standard leads to an increase in the 
cutoff cost (both eq. 13 and 14 are positive) and an increase in export 
(both eq. 10 and 11 are positive).  
Summing up, defining a variable z equal to either Tji or Fji, we see 
the sign of  z jiE c is the same as that of  z jiE r  in all cases except 
when the cost effect dominates and compliance costs are fixed. In this 
case  z jiE r is either zero or positive, but very small, whereas 
 z jiE c is negative. 
2.2. Aggregation 
To find the effects on total export and the two margins of trade, we fol-
low the discussion in Lawless (2010). The extensive margin (the num-
ber of exporters) is given by: 
(15) 
0
( )
jic
ji j jn n g c dc   
The elasticity of nji with respect to z is given by 
(16)     ( )jz ji j ji ji z ji
ji
n
E n g c c E c
n
    
Eq. (16) shows that sign of the elasticity for the extensive margin is 
equal to the sign of the elasticity for the cutoff cost. 
Total export is given by: 
(17) 
0
( ) ( )
jic
ji j ji jR n r c g c dc   
And the elasticity is 
(18)      
0
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
jic
j
z ji ji ji ji ji z ji ji j z ji
ji
n
E R r c g c c E c z r c g c dc E r
R z
  
   
    
  
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The first part of (18) denotes the change in total exports due to 
changes in export of firms that start or stop exporting; the second part 
denotes changes of incumbent exporters.  
Again, the effect of imposing a food standard is unclear and will de-
pend on the magnitude of cost and demand effects discussed in rela-
tion to eq. (10), (11), (13) and (14). If the cost effect dominates, 
  0jizE c   and  z jiE r is either negative (in the case of variable com-
pliance costs) or zero/slightly positive (in the case of fixed compliance 
costs). Consequently, in this case  z jiE R as well as  z jiE n  are nega-
tive, regardless of the nature of compliance costs. Total exports and the 
extensive margin will decline; since the cutoff cost level will decrease, 
fewer firms will find it profitable to export, whereas export of incum-
bent exporters will either decline (in the case of variable compliance 
costs) or change very little (in the case of fixed compliance costs). If the 
demand effect dominates, the opposite applies:   0jzE c   and 
  0z jiE r   thus  z jiE R as well as  z jiE n are positive (both when 
compliance costs are variable and when they are fixed). Total exports 
and the extensive margin will increase. 
The intensive margin (average exports per firm) is given by: 
(19) 
ji
ji
ji
R
I
n
  
and 
(20) 
     
     
0
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
ji
z ji z ji z ji
c
j j ji ji ji j
ji ji ji ji z ji ji z ji
ji ji ji
E I E R E n
n g c c r c g c
n r c R E c z dc E r
R n z
 
  
    
    

 
where we have used eq. (16) and (18) in the second equality. We 
know that ( ) <0ji ji ji jin r c R because the number of exporters times the 
export revenue of the cutoff exporter must be lower than total export 
revenue (since the cutoff exporter is the firm that exports least). Conse-
quently, the first part of the last equality in eq. (20) has the opposite 
sign of  z jiE c . The second part has the same sign as  z jiE r . From 
the discussion above, we know that  z jiE c and  z jiE r have the same 
sign for all cases except when the cost effect dominates and compliance 
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costs are fixed. Thus, for all other cases,  z jiE I is undetermined: the 
change in the intensive margin when a food standard is imposed can go 
in either direction. In the case of a dominant cost effect and variable 
compliance costs, each firm will export less, which will tend to de-
crease the intensive margin. At the same time, the cutoff costs level will 
decrease, so the least-selling exporters will stop exporting, and this will 
tend to increase the intensive margin. In the case of a dominant de-
mand effect, whether due to variable or fixed compliance costs, the 
converse is true. In the case of a dominant cost effect and fixed compli-
ance costs, however,  
jiT ji
E r  is either zero or positive, but very small, 
thus the sign of  
jiT ji
E I is the opposite of that of  
jiT ji
E c . Then each 
firm’s export is unaffected (or slightly increased), but the cutoff cost 
level decreases, and so the least-selling exporters quit exporting. Con-
sequently the intensive margin increases (Lawless, 2010).  
Table 1 summarises the effects of the imposition of a food standard 
on total export and the two margins of trade under the four different 
scenarios: variable and fixed compliance costs for dominant cost and 
demand effects. Cost and demand effects have opposite signs on total 
export and the extensive margin of trade. Thus, any trade-reducing 
effects from standards may be offset if the imposition of a standard has 
a positive effect on demand. Consequently, the model provides a theo-
retical foundation for the demand explanation of the ‘two faces of 
standards’ hypothesis. 
Furthermore, if there is a dominant costs effect so that the extensive 
margin declines, the sign of the effect on the intensive margin will indi-
cate whether compliance costs are mainly fixed or variable. A negative 
effect on the intensive margin would indicate that compliance costs are 
mainly variable, because the effect should be positive if compliance 
costs were mainly fixed.5  
                                                          
5  This holds when we do not make any assumptions about gj(c). In the case of Pareto-
distributed firm productivity, the effect on the intensive margin for a dominant cost 
effect and variable compliance costs is zero (see discussion in Lawless, 2010). The 
same is true for a dominant demand effect, independently of whether compliance 
costs are variable or fixed. 
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Table 1. Effects on the different margins of export 
 Dominant effect 
 
Cost Demand 
Compliance costs are Compliance costs are 
variable fixed variable fixed 
Total export – – + + 
Extensive margin  
(number of exporting firms) 
– – + + 
Intensive margin  
(average export per firm) 
? + ? ? 
2.3. Differences between countries and products 
Whether cost or demand effects will dominate depends on characteris-
tics of products and export destinations.6 For some products-groups or 
export destinations, compliance costs may be mainly variable; for oth-
ers, they may be mainly fixed. Furthermore, due to differences in fac-
tors like preferences, technology, knowledge, and reputation, parame-
ters like Tji, Fji, εji, ηji, μji and λji may vary. For example, for fresh food, 
transport costs are particularly high, as these require costly cooling 
arrangements during transport, and air shipment is likely. Then cost of 
compliance may constitute a small part of the total (low μji/λji). In addi-
tion, uncertainties about quality and safety are probably more pro-
nounced for fresh food, and demand may be more sensitive to reputa-
tion. The Norwegian seafood industry has made large investments in 
generic marketing that extols the high quality, clean and healthy as-
pects of Norwegian seafood, and the products have a good reputation 
in many countries. We could therefore expect that Norway has high 
compliance capacity for seafood, and in particular for fresh products 
(low Tji/Fji together with high εji/ηji). This could imply a dominating 
demand effect.  
In addition, Norway is a highly developed country, which could im-
ply a favourable distortion effect. As pointed out in section 1, foreign 
standards more often lead export decline in developing countries than 
in developed ones. In terms of the model presented above, there may 
be various reasons for this. Products from developing countries may be 
further away from complying with the standard at the outset, or low 
technology levels may make it particularly costly to comply with the 
standard. Products may also have a poor reputation, making them sub-
ject to costly border controls. In all these cases, compliance may re-
                                                          
6  For simplicity, we have assumed that there is only one differentiated goods prod-
uct-group in the model presented above. However, the model can easily be extend-
ed to several product-groups with different εji, ηji, μji, and λji. 
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quire considerable increases in Tji and/or Fji without necessarily lead-
ing to any significant increase in demand ( ji  and/or ji  are low). Fi-
nally, poor knowledge about foreign rules and laws can make compli-
ance costs constitute a large part of the total, in which case ji  and/or 
ji  will be high. In all cases, total export and also the extensive margin 
are likely to decrease as a consequence of the imposition of a standard. 
If the extensive margin declines in a large number of (developing) 
countries, the competitive advantage of countries that do not experi-
ence such decline is strengthened. To demonstrate, let us assume that 
cost and demand effects exactly cancel out in a given country j’ export-
ing to country i, and that only variable compliance costs affect the 
quality-perception parameter (qj’i) so that ' 'j i j i  and ' 0j i  . The 
ideal price index of an importer for a given good, s
iP , following from 
(2), is given by:   
(21) 
 
     
1
1
1
1 0
1
1
1 1
1 0
( )
( ) ,  where / 0
1
ji
ji
ji ji jiji
c
M
i j ji j
j
c
M
j ji ji ji j j i ji
j
P n p c g c dc
n T F c g c dc P c



   






  

 
  
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
We have inserted from eq. (1), (5), (6) and (8) in the last equality. 
From the discussion above, we know that in countries where the cost 
effect dominates, an increase in Tji/Fji induces a decrease in jic . From 
(21) it is easily seen that if jic  decreases in a large number of countries, 
Pi and hence Bi can no longer be considered exogenous. The number of 
firms exporting to i will decrease, and this will induce an increase in Pi 
and hence Bi (see eq. 4). From eq. (9) and (12) we can easily see that 
the elasticities of jic and jir with respect to Bi are, respectively, 
 
1
1i
B jiE c



  and   1
iB ji
E r  . These are positive. Consequently, 
even though there is no dominant demand effect in country j’, this 
country will experience an increase in total export and the extensive 
margin due to the increase in Bi.7 The reason is that the competitive 
advantage in country j’ improves due to the diversion of demand away 
from countries where the cost effect is dominant. The model thus also 
                                                          
7  The effects are analogous to those from Tji and/or Fji in the case of a dominating 
demand effect, thus the effect on the intensive margin is ambiguous.  
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provides a theoretical foundation for the distortion explanation of the 
‘two faces of standards’ hypothesis. 
In the next section I test how foreign standards affect Norwegian 
seafood export. As demonstrated above, both the demand effect and a 
favourable distortion effect would tend to increase total exports and the 
extensive margin of trade. This could be particularly likely to happen 
for fresh Norwegian seafood products. I therefore test whether the im-
pact of foreign standards differ for such products. 
 
 3. Empirical evidence: Norwegian 
seafood exports, and the role of 
SPS and TBT 
3.1. The dataset 
The dataset for Norwegian seafood exports has been provided by Statis-
tics Norway and covers firm-level exports during 1996–2013. The data 
do not include evidence on other (non-trade) firm characteristics such 
as employment or domestic sales. Exporters include fish-farming pro-
ducers, fish companies based on catch, seafood processing firms and 
pure trading companies. The Norwegian seafood export business is 
relatively fragmented, with above 400 exporters each year throughout 
the period, selling to between 124 and 162 export destinations.8 Table 
A1 in Appendix 1 presents some key figures. The average exporter ex-
ported to seven countries, with average value per country increasing 
from NOK 11 to 19 million over the period. The top exporter in 2013 
had an export value of more than USD one billion. Contrary to what 
might be expected in light of globalisation, the total number of destina-
tion countries declined slightly over time, despite a strong increase in 
exports. 
Export data are disaggregated by destination country as well as by 
product, and we define a ‘market’ as a product-country combination: 
for example, the exports of fresh salmon fillet to Sweden. Product clas-
sifications change considerably over time; and unless this is corrected 
for, there will be a lot of ‘spurious’ entry and exit.9 We therefore reclas-
sify to make classification consistent over time, thereby reducing the 
number of products from 560 to 230. Table A2 in Appendix 1 presents 
key data on 53 main products (e.g. sales and growth rates), covering 
90–93 per cent of exports in each year. The largest product in 2013 
was fresh farmed salmon, which represented more than half of total 
seafood exports in 2013. For total seafood exports, the annual growth 
rate was 3.2 per cent; but, for more than half of the selected products 
                                                          
8  Throughout the period, the total number of export destinations amounted to more 
than 200, so Norway exported to practically all countries in the world.  
9  National classifications build on the internationally agreed HS (Harmonised Sys-
tem) tariff nomenclature maintained by the WCO (World Customs Organization). The 
HS system has been revised several times: for this period one has HS1996, 
HS2002, HS2007 and HS2012. Especially in 2012, there were many classification 
changes for the seafood sector. The most disaggregated HS level is at six digits; 
the Norwegian system has further subdivisions at the eight-digit level. Some of the 
classification changes over time are due to national changes at the eight-digit level. 
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(29 products), the export growth rate during the period was actually 
negative. Hence we note a wide range of outcomes, with an upward 
trend for farmed fish (salmon and trout, recently also some species of 
whitefish) and deteriorating performance for many types of catch-
based and processed exports. In 2013, total Norwegian seafood exports 
stood at NOK 62 billion, of which NOK 42 billion were salmon and trout 
products, with fresh products representing 37 billion. In the regression 
analysis presented in the next section, we look for separate effects for 
fresh seafood. Fresh salmon will be the largest subcomponent. 
3.2. Extensive vs. intensive market growth 
Figure 1 decomposes the change in exports over the whole time period 
into the extensive and intensive margins, based on firm-level data. 
Note that due to the use of diaggregated date here we define the two 
margins somewhat differently than in section 2 and 3.3 (also see foot-
note 4). Using the term ‘trades’ for firm-product-country combinations, 
the intensive margin is defined as changes in export for trades surviv-
ing from one year to the next. In the Figure, this is decomposed into 
‘stay’ (the percentage of trades or export value that survives), and ‘In-
tensive+’ (the percentage value increase for surviving trades). The ex-
tensive margin is defined as the percentage change in trades or export 
value due to firm-product-country entry and exit. In the Figure we show 
both entry and exit in addition to net entry, the latter being the sum of 
the first two. For all categories the Figure shows results based on the 
number of trades and the value of exports for these trades (except for 
Intensive+, where the change in the number of trades is zero, per defi-
nition). Whereas the number of trades declined from 12 193 in 1996 to 
9 027 in 2013, the export value increased from NOK 38 to 62 billion.10 
Figure 1 shows average rates of change for the years 1997–2013, ex-
pressed in percentage of the total number of trades or the total export 
value in the preceding year.  
                                                          
10  Measured in 2013 NOK, using the Norwegian GDP deflator. 
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Figure 1: Extensive and intensive margins of trade: Average change 1997–
2013   
(percentage of previous year total export value or number of ‘trades’) 
 
Note: The Figure is based on firm level data on Norwegian seafood exporters 
provided by Statistics Norway. ‘Trades‘ refers to firm-product-country combi-
nations. The extensive margin is Net entry, which denotes the increase in the 
number of trades/export value due to trades entrants (Entry) minus the loss 
due to trades exits (Exit). The intensive margin is described by Stay and Inten-
sive +, the first denoting changes in number of trades or export value for 
trades surviving from one period to the next, and the latter denoting the value 
increase for these surviving trades. 
As to the number of trades (the darker columns), we note that almost 
half (45.7 per cent) of the trades from the preceding year do not survive 
from one year to the next. However, there is considerable entry (44.0 
per cent), so net entry is modest (–1.7 per cent annual average).  
We now turn to export value, which was much larger for incumbent 
trades; even if only 54.3 per cent of the trades survived from one year 
to the next, these trades represented 88.7 per cent of the export value 
of the preceding year. Furthermore, the export value of the incumbent 
trades increased on average by a value equivalent to 3.0 per cent of the 
preceding year’s total exports. This may be compared to the export val-
ue change due to entry and exit, which averaged 0.2 per cent per year. 
Aggregating over the whole period 1996–2013, we find an export val-
ue growth of NOK 24 billion. Out of this, 22 billion was due to stay (the 
intensive margin), and 1.6 billion was due to net entry (the extensive 
margin).11 On the whole, therefore, the major changes in export were at 
the intensive margin. 
While the net effect of exit and exit was modest, Figure 1 demonstrates 
that the gross magnitude was very large, with massive ‘churning’ in 
exports. This is an interesting issue for further research. It should also 
                                                          
11  While the extensive margin was negative measured by the number of trades, enter-
ing trades had larger sales than exiting trades, so the extensive margin was posi-
tive when measured by export value.  
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be noted that entrants may increase their export gradually over some 
years, whereas measurement from one year to the next does not cap-
ture this impact of entry over time.12  
3.3. The impact of SPS and TBT on seafood exports: Econo-
metric evidence 
This section aims to provide new econometric evidence on the impact 
of SPSs and TBTs in international seafood trade. Based on the theory 
framework presented in section 2, we perform an econometric gravity 
analysis for one exporter and many importers, hypothesising that Nor-
wegian export to a country is a function of exporting costs to that coun-
try and its GDP level (see UNCTAD and WTO, 2012 for an introduction 
to econometric gravity analysis).  
3.3.1 Dependent variables  
For use as dependent variables in the regression analyses, three aggre-
gated variables were constructed for each product-country combination 
reflecting different measures of export: total export value of product v 
to country i (exportivt), the number of firms exporting product v to coun-
try i (extensiveivt), and their average export value (intensiveivt). Export 
values are measured in current NOK. Following the tradition in the 
gravity literature, we use the logs of the variables in the estimation. 
In line with some other studies (e.g. Buono and Lalanne, 2012; Besedi-
na, 2015), we use aggregated variables based on firm-level data. An 
advantage of this approach is to reduce the influence of data noise, 
which is generally higher, the more disaggregated the data are. For 
example, if a firm changes identification number due to data inaccura-
cy but the underlying activity is unchanged, this will appear as entry 
and exit in the microdata, but the aggregate variables (number of firms, 
average sales) will be unaffected. Furthermore, the proportion of zeros 
in the data is reduced. An alternative could be to use the firm-level data 
directly, as in Kneller et al. (2008) or Chen et al. (2008). The advantage 
of this is that entry and exit is measured more accurately (provided that 
the data are correct), and that we get a larger number of observations.13  
We do not have data for the firms’ total production or domestic sales. 
However, this is not a major limitation, as we do not analyse entry and 
                                                          
12  For example, among Colombian firms Eaton et al. (2008) find that most new export-
ers sell a very small amount to only one foreign country and soon give up exporting. 
But that those that survive often experience a rapid expansion in their export val-
ues as well as in the number of countries to which they export. 
13  By definition, firm-level data reflect gross exit and entry, whereas aggregate data 
on the number of firms reflect only net entry, unless special variables on entering 
and exiting firms are created. 
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exit into exports as such but entry into individual export markets, and 
90–95 per cent of Norway’s seafood production is exported.14   
3.3.2 Explanatory variables 
SPS and TBT 
In order to measure food standards, we use notification data on regular 
SPSs and TBTs from the WTO Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP 
database).15 We construct one dummy variable for SPS notifications, 
spsivt, and one for TBT notifications, tbtivt. The dummies are equal to 1 
from year t and onwards if importing country i imposed at least one 
SPS/TBT on product v in year t. Over one third –35.5 per cent – of the 
observations included in the main analysis presented in section 3.3.5 
are covered by at least one SPS and 7.2 per cent by at least one TBT.16 
As pointed out in sections 1 and 2, standards can be both trade-
restricting and trade-enhancing. Effects may vary across products, and 
stricter standards may have a greater impact on demand for fresh 
products (see discussion in section 2.3). We therefore interact spsivt and 
tbtivt with a dummy for fresh seafood products (fresh). 
Withdrawals of SPSs and TBTs are not reported in the data, thus spsivt 
and tbtivt are always weakly increasing in t. The number of notifications 
has increased considerably over time, which probably reflects notifica-
tion practice rather than policy change. The quality of notifications in 
terms of accuracy and completeness has been questioned (Bacchetta et 
al., 2012). However, the potential ‘notification bias’ originating from 
these issues is limited, as we operate with a short time period (2001–
2011). There is also little reason to believe that heterogeneity across 
sectors – which is a main focus of this paper – should be affected by the 
potential ‘notification bias’. It should be noted, however, that WTO 
notifications do not measure the strictness or restrictive impact of SPS 
or TBT.  
Control variables 
While the impact of SPSs/TBTs is our main focus, we include several 
control variables. These are ad valorem tariffs (tariffivt), two dummies 
for free trade agreements (FTAs): eeait for membership in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and  ftait for other free trade agreements (to cap-
ture effects from FTAs that go beyond tariff reductions, such as reduc-
                                                          
14  This information was provided orally by the Norwegian Seafood Export Council. 
15  http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/default.aspx?language=en  
16  In some cases, a country has not reported the HS categories at which the regulation 
is imposed. In these cases we use the WTO-interpreted HS categories reported in 
the database. Few notifications are reported at the detailed six-digit level; most are 
reported at the four-digit level, and some only at the two-digit level. In the two lat-
ter cases we assume that the regulation affects all corresponding six-digit subcate-
gories. However, for HS chapters that also include non-seafood products (chapters 
5, 15, 16 and 23) we do not include the notification if it is evident from the product 
and/or measure description that it does not concern seafood. 
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tions in non-tariff barriers), costs related to procedures for importing a 
container (impcostit), an index of good regulatory quality (a higher in-
dex indicates better regulatory quality) (regqualit), GDP (gdpit), GDP per 
capita (cgdpit), the per cent growth in the exchange rate between NOK 
and the local currency (gexchit), and per capita (apparent) consump-
tion of seafood in kg (consit). 
To be able to take advantage of the longer time-series of our export and 
SPS/TBT notification data, we use extra- or interpolation for control 
variables where not all years are covered. The most important variable 
where this is done is tariffivt, where we only have data for years 2001, 
2004 and 2007, due to the use of the MacMap database (see Appendix 
2 for details).17 We linearly interpolate tariffivt for the interim missing 
years and set the value for years after 2007 equal to the 2007 level. 
This should be a fairly good approximation, due to the stepwise reduc-
tion of tariffs agreed upon in the Uruguay Round and the fact that all 
commitments of tariff reductions were completed by 2005. We do not 
extrapolate for years before 2001, as major changes in tariffs following 
commitments from the Uruguay Round were made prior to that year. In 
section 3.3.6 we perform two different sensitivity analyses of the treat-
ment of the tariff variable. Both show that main results are fairly ro-
bust.  
In addition to spsivt and tbtivt, tariffivt is the only explanatory variable 
that varies in the product dimension (in addition to the country dimen-
sion).18 See Appendix 2 for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
3.3.3. Estimation method  
Inserting from eq. (1), (9) and (12) in, respectively, eq. (15), (17), and 
(19), we can express the three dependent variables as functions of dif-
ferent types of trade costs and demand conditions. In addition, we 
know from the discussion in section 2.3 that effects may differ between 
product-groups. We therefore estimate the following reduced forms of 
equations (15), (17), and (19): 
(22)  
 
*
1 1 1
*
1 1
ln
ln
sps sps fresh tbt
ivt ivt ivt
ivt tbt fresh tarff
ivt ivt ivt
β sps β sps * fresh β tbt
y
β tbt * fresh β tariff


  
 
  

    it tγx d
 
                                                          
17  We use this database because it is constructed for analytical purposes and thereby 
contains better information on applied tariffs than other sources. It also contains 
the ad valorem tariff equivalent of quotas and other kinds of tariffs. Quotas are im-
portant, for example for Norwegian export to the EU countries. 
18  The product dimension of these variables is given at six-digit HS level, whereas that 
of the dependent variables is given at the eight-digit level. We have chosen to op-
erate with different aggregation levels in order to be able to correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the most disaggregated level possible (see below). 
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‘where yivt indicates either exportivt, extensiveivt or intensiveivt. Our main 
explanatory variables of interest are spsivt-1 and tbtivt-1. The vector xit 
represents the set of control variables that vary only in the country di-
mension. dt is a vector of year-dummies. 
In our main estimation model we follow the tradition in the gravity lit-
erature of taking the natural logarithms yivt, and then estimating (22) 
using OLS. Unlike most other studies, we apply a within/fixed effects 
estimation, due to the possible incidence of unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries and products that is correlated with the other explana-
tory variables. 19  Such heterogeneity may arise due to differences 
across countries as to how committed they are to report correct notifica-
tions and at a sufficiently detailed level, or due to differences in de-
mand and trading conditions not captured by the explanatory varia-
bles. For example, countries where consumers have strong preferences 
for a particular seafood product will have high demand for this product 
and may also be more concerned with the safety and quality of the 
product. These countries may therefore be more likely to impose an SPS 
on the product. In this case, unobserved consumer preferences for par-
ticular products would be positively correlated with the dependent var-
iables as well as with the SPS variable. In the presence of such hetero-
geneity, estimating (22) using pooled OLS or random effects would 
yield biased coefficient estimates. In section 3.3.6 we perform a sensi-
tivity test showing that there is in fact such correlation, necessitating 
the within/fixed effects estimation method. This approach implies as-
suming that the error term consists of two terms, εivt=eiv+uivt, where eiv 
captures time-invariant differences between countries and products. 
The eiv are then included as dummies in the OLS estimation of (22). The 
fixed effects are at the country-product level, which implies that we 
cannot include time-invariant country and product variables (including 
dummies), as these will be soaked up by the fixed effects. 
Cross-sectional heteroscedasticity is a common problem in trade data 
(see e.g. Flam and Nordström, 2011). We therefore compute cluster-
robust standard errors at the country level.20 In other words, we as-
sume that standard errors are independently, but not necessarily iden-
tically, distributed. This also allows for interdependence of intracoun-
try errors such as serial correlation. 
                                                          
19  Also Buono and Lalanne (2012) use this method. 
20  Cameron and Miller (2011) suggest several guidelines for determining the appro-
priate level of clustering. First, if one is interested in the estimated coefficient for 
an aggregated explanatory variable, one should cluster at the level of aggregation 
of that variable. Our main explanatory variables of interest are the SPS and TBT var-
iables. As explained above, most of these are reported at the four-digit or two-digit 
HS product level. Second, clusters should be implemented at the most aggregate 
level where intracluster serial correlation is likely to occur. By clustering at the 
country level, we account for serial correlation both within countries and within 
country-product groups over time. See also Angrist and Pischke (2008), pp. 237–
238.  
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It should be emphasised that that using the within/fixed effects estima-
tion method implies looking for an impact on export of a given product 
to a given country over time. We do not investigate whether the level of 
Norwegian export is different in countries that impose SPSs and/or 
TBTs on particular products, but rather whether, on average, Norwe-
gian export of a particular product to a particular country changes 
when the country imposes a TBT and/or SPS.  
spsivt, tbtivt and tariffivt may suffer from contemporaneous endogeneity: 
a positive shock to export may induce a country to impose an SPS or 
TBT or to raise tariffs. For this reason we lag these three variables one 
year. However, we might still have a problem with violation of the strict 
exogeneity assumption underlying the within/fixed effects model. This 
assumption requires the uivts to be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables in any year. In the presence of contemporaneous endogenei-
ty, lagging the endogenous variables will per definition lead to correla-
tion between the errors in year t and the endogenous variables in year 
t+1 – which is a violation of the strict exogeneity assumption. There is 
also a potential problem with feedback going back more than one peri-
od: an unexpected positive shock to Norwegian export in period t may 
induce a country to impose an SPS, TBT or tariff in, say, year t+2. How-
ever, as pointed out by Wooldridge (2012, ch. 11.6), lagging variables 
that are contemporaneously endogenous will mitigate the endogeneity 
problem. Furthermore, given that contemporaneous exogeneity holds, 
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption is often less severe in the 
within/fixed effects model when the total number of time periods, T, is 
large (Wooldridge, 2012, pp. 323–324). In our analysis T=10, which is 
fairly large. However, in section 3.3.6 we perform a test of the strict 
exogeneity assumption, and do not find indications that the assump-
tion is violated.21 
Using the natural logarithm of exportivt, extensiveivt or intensiveivt as 
dependent variables in our main estimation forces us to drop all obser-
vations where Norwegian export of a particular product to a particular 
country is zero (since the log of zero is not defined). Therefore, the main 
model may suffer from sample selection bias. UNCTAD and WTO (2012, 
ch. 3a and b) discuss various methods of including the zero trade flows 
in the gravity model. In section 3.3.6 we apply a panel version of the 
                                                          
21  Another alternative would be to estimate the model in first differences. As the with-
in/fixed effects model, this model also allows for unobserved heterogeneity to be 
correlated with the explanatory variables. For example, Besedina (2015) applies a 
first-differences model investigating the impact of SPS and TBT measures for some 
exporting countries. In a gravity model of multiple exporters and importers Kohl 
(2013) finds that the strict exogeneity assumption is violated in a within mod-
el/fixed effects, but not in a first-differences model. He therefore chooses the lat-
ter. However, violation of the strict exogeneity assumption is often more severe in 
first-differences models than in fixed-effects models (Wooldridge 2012, pp. 323–
324). Since we find no sign of violation of the strict exogeneity assumption in the 
estimation of (1), we choose the fixed effects approach. 
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Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood method (PPML) proposed by San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to allow for this. Our analysis indicates 
that the main results are fairly robust to the exclusion of the zero ob-
servations. 
3.3.4. Sample characteristics 
Due to lack of data for tariffs and some of the other variables, we in-
clude only data from 2001 to 2011. Furthermore, one year is used to 
construct lagged values of spsivt, tbtivt and tariffivt, so the sample period 
runs from 2002 to 2011. There is export to practically all countries in 
the world (176) and of 214 products at the eight-digit HS level during 
this period. However, the sample is restricted to WTO members, as 
these are the only countries for which we have data for SPS and TBT 
notifications. Seven countries joined the WTO during the sample period 
and are therefore not included in all years. As a consequence of WTO 
non-membership, observations amounting to approximately 13 per 
cent of the total Norwegian seafood export value throughout the sam-
ple period have been dropped. We also omit observations covering an 
additional 22 per cent of total export value due to lack of tariff data. 
Note, however, that results for spsivt-1 and tbtivt-1 are fairly robust to in-
cluding these observations and at the same time dropping the tariff 
variable (see section 3.3.6). Our sample covers 64 per cent of total ex-
port value, and fresh products comprise 60 per cent of this. The sample 
consists of an unbalanced panel with 104 countries and 41 products.     
In the main analysis presented in section 3.3.5, all observations indi-
cating zero export drop out of the analysis, and the sample consist of 7 
545 observations distributed on 1 532 country-product groups. By con-
trast, in the PPML analysis presented in section 3.3.6, only intragroup 
observations that are zero for all years are dropped, resulting in a near-
doubling of the number of observations included.  
3.3.5 Results: The main model 
SPSs and TBTs 
Results from our main model are shown in Table 2. The main explana-
tory variables of interest are spsivt-1 and tbtivt-1 (and their interactions 
with fresh). The Table clearly demonstrates direct negative impacts 
from spsivt-1 on all dependent variables. If an importing country impos-
es an SPS on a given product, total Norwegian export of the product to 
the country is reduced by 31.2 per cent.22 This reduction is due to the 
reduced number exporters as well as reduced exports per firm, the lat-
ter effect being somewhat greater than the former. Also TBTs have a 
negative impact on export, but significantly so only for extensiveivt, and 
the effect is only about half of than that from SPSs: imposing a TBT is 
associated with an 8.4 per cent decrease in the number of exporters, 
                                                          
22  To find the estimated percentage change in yivt, %Δ̂yivt, associated with spsivt-1 
changing from 0 to 1, we must use the following formula: %Δŷivt =100*(expβ̂sps -1), 
where β̂sps is the estimated βsps ( Wooldridge (2003, p. 184).  
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whereas imposing an SPS is associated with a decrease of 15.8 per 
cent. The results from the direct effects clearly show that after a country 
imposed a food standard, Norwegian export was reduced. The negative 
(insignificant) estimated coefficient for spsivt-1 (tbtivt) in the estimation 
of intensiveivt indicates that SPSs and TBTs mainly represent variable 
costs of trade (see discussion of Table 1 in section 2). These results are 
in accordance with survey evidence, which reveal fairly low fixed ex-
port costs for Norwegian seafood exporters (Medin and Melchior, 
2002). 
Whereas the SPS and TBT variables reflect the direct effects for the 
whole sample, their interactions with fresh show large differences 
across products. Estimated coefficients for both interaction terms are 
positive and significant in the estimation of all three dependent varia-
bles (albeit only at 10 per cent level for tbtivt-1*fresh in the estimation of 
exportivt and intensiveivt. In fact, for SPSs the estimated effects from the 
interaction terms are sufficiently large to more than cancel out the di-
rect negative effects. The size of the estimated coefficients reveals that 
for fresh seafood products, the net increase in total export associated 
with a country imposing an SPS is as much as 57.1 per cent. Further-
more, the effect on intensiveivt is almost three times larger than the ef-
fect on extensiveivt. Thus we see that, despite the overall trade-reducing 
effects, SPSs are trade-enhancing for fresh seafood products. Food 
standards are probably especially important for such products, as a 
guarantee of quality and safety.  A plausible explanation for our result 
is therefore that SPSs serve to reduce consumer uncertainty about the 
quality and safety of fresh seafood products, and thereby increase de-
mand.23  
That being said, we should not interpret the result to say that SPSs are 
always export-promoting for fresh products. There have been cases 
where SPS controls and delays have hindered the export of fresh sea-
food and caused losses – as with fresh salmon exports to Russia from 
2006 (Holm and Kokkvoll, 2007) or to China after 2010 (Chen and Gar-
cia, 2015). These cases are not represented in the data: Russia because 
it was not a WTO member until 2012 and is therefore not included in 
the SPS/TBT dataset, and China because the notification data do not 
count unofficial measures like those imposed on Norway after 2010.  
In general, the estimated coefficients for tbtivt-1 are less significant than 
those for spsivt-1. This is probably due to low variation in the TBT varia-
ble: only 2.5 per cent of the observations vary over time, and only these 
will contribute to the estimation of the coefficients for tbtivt-1 (due to the 
                                                          
23  Also note that for the main export market for Norwegian seafood, the EU, there is a 
strict SPS regime that Norway is part of; this regime may facilitate exports of fresh 
salmon to the EU. However, our results are not driven by the EU countries: exclud-
ing these countries from the data still yields significantly positive net effects from 
spsivt-1 on exportivt-1 and extensiveivt-1. 
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fixed effects/within approach). For spsivt-1, on the other hand, 26.5 per 
cent of observations vary over time, and these also consist of diversified 
countries and products. 
Other variables 
Increased tariffs have a negative influence on total exports and the 
number of exporters, but there is no indication of an influence on aver-
age exports. This is consistent with the Chaney (2008) model with Pare-
to-distributed firm productivity (see footnote 10 and Lawless, 2010), or 
with a model where firms have equal productivity (see Medin, 2013). 
Buono and Lalanne (2012) investigate the effect of tariff reductions on 
the extensive and intensive margins of French exporters 1993–2002 
using a within/fixed effects estimation as we do. They find that in-
creased tariffs are associated with a decrease in the intensive margin, 
but not the extensive margin. Hence they conclude that tariff reduc-
tions following the Uruguay Round did not help new firms starting to 
export: they only helped incumbent exporters to export more. Here, we 
find exactly the opposite: reduced tariffs can indeed be an important 
policy tool for encouraging firms to export to new markets.  
The coefficients for FTAs, whether the EEA or others, are not significant 
for any of the dependent variables (perhaps except for the estimated 
coefficient for ftait, significant at the 10 per cent level in the estimation 
of extensiveivt). This indicates that effects from FTAs beyond those from 
tariff reductions do not influence exports. Other studies vary as regards 
the effects of FTAs on trade. Kohl (2013) presents a survey of empirical 
studies using gravity analysis, and finds no effect from FTAs on trade in 
almost 65 per cent of the cases investigated. Moreover, only about one 
quarter of the agreements lead to increased trade, and 10 per cent ac-
tually had a negative impact.  
As to the remaining control variables, there are no significant effects 
from better regulatory quality, increased costs of importing a container, 
or a depreciation of the NOK. We find that GDP influences all margins 
of trade positively, as expected. GDP per capita has a negative influ-
ence on total export and intensiveivt, and per capita consumption of 
seafood has a positive impact on extensiveivt. 
Within R2 is quite low, ranging from 4–10 per cent. However, R2 is ex-
pected to be low in gravity analyses at such a disaggregated level. 
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Table 2. Results from within/fixed effects regression 
Variable ln(exportivt) ln(extensiveivt) ln(intensiveivt) 
spsivt-1 -0.374*** -0.172*** -0.202** 
  (0.110) (0.052) (0.084) 
spsivt-1 * fresh 0.826*** 0.301*** 0.525*** 
  (0.225) (0.067) (0.200) 
tbtivt-1 -0.103 -0.088*** -0.015 
  (0.098) (0.032) (0.085) 
tbtivt-1 * fresh 0.318** 0.070* 0.248* 
  (0.146) (0.039) (0.125) 
ln(tariffivt-1) -1.487** -0.631*** -0.855 
  (0.601) (0.166) (0.659) 
ftait 0.350 0.139* 0.211 
  (0.238) (0.080) (0.169) 
eeait -0.085 -0.129 0.044 
  (0.230) (0.086) (0.177) 
regqualit 0.184 0.033 0.151 
  (0.187) (0.085) (0.164) 
ln(impcostsit) 0.026 -0.031 0.057 
  (0.505) (0.155) (0.464) 
ln(gdpit) 2.244*** 0.578** 1.666*** 
  (0.382) (0.250) (0.290) 
ln(cgdpit) -1.321*** -0.242 -1.079*** 
  (0.361) (0.253) (0.226) 
ln(consit) 0.188 0.286*** -0.098 
  (0.252) (0.096) (0.204) 
gexchit -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
constant -35.469*** -12.808*** -22.661*** 
  (7.387) (4.370) (5.506) 
No obs 7,545 7,545 7,545 
R2 0.041 0.097 0.045 
No group 1,532 1,532 1,532 
 
Note:  exportivt = export value of product v to country i, extensiveivt = number 
of firms exporting product v to country i, and intensiveivt = their average export 
value. Estimation method:  within/fixed effects OLS (fixed effects at the coun-
try-product level). Year-dummies included, but not reported. Std. dev. in pa-
rentheses (cluster robust errors with clustering at country level). *, **, *** 
indicate significance level at 10% , 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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3.3.6. Results: Robustness checks 
In order to test the robustness of the results, especially regarding the 
impact of SPSs and TBTs, we have run some alternative estimations of 
(22). Here we give a brief description; detailed results are reported in 
Appendix 3.  
Firstly, we test for sample selection bias by investigating how sensitive 
the results from the main model are to including the zero trade flows 
(see section 3.3.3). We apply a panel PPML method, where we, unlike 
in the main model, use exportivt, extensiveivt and intensiveivt as depend-
ent variables, not their logs. The model therefore includes the zero 
trade flows in a natural way. We use fixed effects/within estimation to 
correct for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the country-
product level, just as in the main model.24 The results are fairly similar 
to those from the main model, in terms of sign and significance, espe-
cially for spsivt-1 and its interaction with fresh.25 (See Table A3 for de-
tails.) The most important difference is that in the PPML model the es-
timated coefficient for spsivt-1 is not significant in the estimation of ex-
portivt. However, it is significant in the estimation of extensiveivt as well 
as intensiveivt, so we do not consider this a major deviation. Further-
more, the estimated coefficients for tbtivt and its interaction with fresh 
are more often significant and also somewhat larger in the PPML mod-
el. For the other explanatory variables, effects are similar in the two 
models. These results indicate that sample selection bias due to the 
omission of zero trade flows in the main model is not severe, despite 
the large number of such flows. Also other scholars have found small 
selection bias in gravity models (Helpman et al., 2008; Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro, 2006). 
Secondly, we look into the assumption of strict exogeneity implied by 
the within/fixed effects approach. As pointed out in section 3.3.3, there 
might be a problem with feedback from spsivt-1, tbtivt-1 and tariffivt-1. To 
check for possible violations of the assumption of strict exogeneity, we 
follow the procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2012, p. 325) and run a 
regression including the leads of spsivt-1, tbtivt-1 and tariffivt-1. In other 
words, we estimate the following equation using within/fixed effects: 
 
                                                          
24  In the PPML estimation we cluster at country-product level rather than country level 
as in the main analysis, because Stata estimation of the fixed effects PPML model 
allows only for clustering at the same level as the fixed effects.  
25  In the PPML estimation E(yivt|zivt)=exp(α+βzivt), where zivt is a vector of the independ-
ent variables and β is the coefficient vector. Consequently, when a zivt is given in 
log, the corresponding β reflects the elasticity, just as in the log-log OLS model 
(Wooldridge, 2012, p. 726). 
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Detailed results are reported in Table A4; neither of the estimated β’s 
proves significant. Although this cannot be taken as evidence that strict 
exogeneity holds, at least it does not indicate any violation of the strict 
exogeneity assumption. See also Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Kohl 
(2013) for discussion of endogeneity problems in gravity models. 
Thirdly, we check whether two alternative treatments of the tariff vari-
able influence the results from the main analysis. In the first, we esti-
mate (22) without the tariffivt-1 variable. This leads not only to a sub-
stantial increase the total export value covered by the sample, but also 
to a large increase in the number of eight-digit HS products included: 
from 41 to 216. Also the number of countries covered by the sample 
increases, from 110 to 118 (see section 3.3.4). Detailed results, provid-
ed in Table A5, show that the effects of spsivt-1, tbtivt-1 and their interac-
tion with fresh are similar to those from the main model. However, they 
are significant somewhat less often, especially for tbtivt-1; and estimated 
coefficients are somewhat smaller. In the second, we estimate (22) for 
the years 2002–2007 only: this means we do not have to make use of 
the extrapolated tariffs, only the interpolated ones, which may be more 
reasonable (see section 3.3.2). Also here, the estimated coefficients for 
spsivt-1 and tbtivt-1 are similar to those for the main analysis, in terms of 
significance as well as size. Furthermore, estimated coefficients for the 
other dependent variables are similar to those from the main analysis 
(see Table A6 for details). All in all, the two alternative treatments of 
the tariff variable indicate that the results from the main analysis are 
fairly robust, especially for spsivt-1. Results for tbtivt-1 are slightly more 
sensitive – but also in the main analysis, results for this variable are 
weaker.  
Fourthly, we check whether it would be adequate to use a pooled or a 
random-effects estimation of (22) instead of the within/fixed effects 
estimation applied in the main model. In that case the estimated coeffi-
cients would reflect differences in SPS and TBT across countries as well 
as within countries over time.26 However, in order for estimates to be 
unbiased, such estimations require the unobserved heterogeneity term 
(eiv) to be uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables (see section 
3.3.3). To test whether there is correlation between eiv and the explana-
tory variables, we add the time-invariant means of all the independent 
variables to equation (22) and then estimate it using random effect as 
                                                          
26  The coefficients from a random-effects estimation are weighted averages between 
those from a within estimation and those from a between estimation.  
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in Mundlak (1978) (also see Wooldridge, 2012, p. 332).27 We find that 
several of the estimated coefficients for the time-invariant means are 
significant, indicating correlation (see Table A7 for details) 28 
  
                                                          
27  In this estimation we include three additional control variables because country-
specific effects are no longer captured by the fixed effects (see Appendix 3 for de-
tails). As in the main model, we cluster at the country level. 
28  Similar results are found in other studies (see e.g. Egger, 2000). 
 4. Conslusions 
In research on international food standards, several recent studies have 
indicated that the impact of food standards on trade differs across sec-
tors or products. Food standards may act as barriers to trade, but they 
may also lead to increased trade. This paper has reviewed the evidence, 
presenting a model where possible explanations of this ‘dual face’ of 
food standards are addressed, and has offered new empirical evidence 
on the impact of food standards for Norwegian seafood export.  
The explanation suggested for a positive relationship between food 
standards and trade is that compliance with standards leads to increas-
es in demand. Standards may entail quality upgrades, or may reduce 
consumer uncertainty about quality and safety of food products. Fur-
thermore, they may improve the competitive advantage of developed 
countries like Norway, since such countries can be assumed to have 
better capacity than others for complying with standards. 
In the empirical analysis we employed data for Norwegian firm-level 
seafood export to different markets (i.e. product-country combina-
tions). First, we presented descriptive evidence showing that already 
existing exporters accounted for most the change in total exports. We 
also noted massive churning in the markets, with large entry and exit; 
but these cancel out, so the net impact of entry was modest. Second, we 
presented a regression analysis investigating how food standards influ-
ence total export to a market as well as the number of exporters (the 
extensive margin) and their average export (the intensive margin). 
WTO notification data on SPS and TBT were used; the results indicate 
that these mainly represent increased variable export costs, not fixed 
ones. On the whole SPSs and TBTs are shown to have a negative impact 
on exports. However, the impact is heterogeneous across products; and 
for export of fresh seafood, SPSs have a positive net impact. These re-
sults are in line with other studies that indicate that the impact of food 
standards is heterogeneous across products. Further research should 
be conducted in order to trace the exact mechanisms underlying this 
apparently contradictory evidence. Another interesting point for future 
research is how firm survival over time is affected by standards and 
non-tariff barriers. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive data 
Table A1: Key figures for Norway’s exports of seafood 1996–2013. Value figures in 2013 NOK (using 
the GDP deflator) 
Year 
Export  
value, total 
Exporters 
Average value per 
exporter 
No of countries 
exported to 
Average no. of coun-
tries per exporter 
Billion NOK Number Mill. NOK Number Number 
1996 38.0 516 19.0 162 6.99 
1997 40.7 500 20.4 151 7.15 
1998 44.8 489 22.4 142 7.32 
1999 46.1 468 23.1 143 7.60 
2000 47.2 473 23.6 146 7.88 
2001 44.2 484 22.1 154 7.60 
2002 40.5 509 20.2 143 7.37 
2003 36.2 521 18.1 150 7.04 
2004 37.9 515 18.9 145 7.11 
2005 41.9 499 20.9 139 7.00 
2006 44.6 477 22.2 132 7.22 
2007 44.4 463 22.1 132 7.12 
2008 42.7 467 21.3 132 6.79 
2009 48.4 439 24.1 135 7.34 
2010 56.6 510 28.2 132 6.41 
2011 55.9 527 27.8 124 6.26 
2012 54.1 530 26.9 133 6.37 
2013 61.9 412 30.7 137 7.79 
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Table A2. Description and key data for 53 product groups. 
HS8 classi-
fication 
Short description  
Export value 
(million 2013 NOK) Annual growth 
rate (%) 
Accumulated change in export (million 2013 NOK) 1996–2013 for: 
1996 2013 Exports 
Intensive margin (in-
cumbent exporters) 
Exit of 
firms 
Entry of 
firms 
Net entry or exit 
3021101 Fish-farm bred trout, fresh 37 1557 24.5 1519 1169 1315 1666 350 
3021201 Fish-farm bred salmon, fresh 8547 31642 8.0 23095 22757 11116 11455 338 
3022102 Halibut, excl. Greenland halibut, fresh 12 115 14.0 103 62 94 135 41 
3024003 North Sea herring, fresh 154 121 -1.4 -33 -106 255 327 73 
3024004 Other herring, fresh 207 5 -19.6 -202 -180 186 164 -22 
3025000 Cod, fresh 384 882 5.0 498 666 1013 845 -168 
3026200 Haddock, excl. livers and roes, fresh 171 253 2.3 82 85 301 297 -4 
3026300 Coalfish, fresh 269 71 -7.6 -199 -151 286 239 -47 
3026903 Red fish, fresh 178 41 -8.3 -137 -108 155 126 -29 
3026906 Angler fish, fresh 33 74 4.9 41 32 175 184 9 
3032101 Fish-farm bred trout, frozen 668 602 -0.6 -66 -123 2701 2758 57 
3032201 Fish-farm bred salmon frozen 1106 1396 1.4 290 177 4314 4428 114 
3033101 Greenland halibut, frozen 458 350 -1.6 -108 -83 1535 1509 -25 
3035002 Other herring incl.’mussa’, frozen 714 1314 3.7 601 64 3155 3691 536 
3035003 North Sea herring, frozen 727 200 -7.3 -527 -390 1262 1124 -138 
3036000 Cod, frozen 302 1352 9.2 1049 617 1880 2312 433 
3037200 Haddock, frozen 318 848 5.9 531 405 1074 1200 126 
3037300 Coalfisk, frozen 112 240 4.6 128 73 950 1006 55 
3037401 Mackerel <600g, frozen 2292 2690 0.9 398 102 3526 3822 296 
3037402 Mackerel >600g, frozen 653 52 -13.8 -601 -637 1199 1236 36 
3037902 Red fish, frozen 107 42 -5.4 -65 -76 583 594 11 
3038000 Livers and roes 36 94 5.9 59 -41 360 459 100 
3041002 Fillets of cod, fresh 87 307 7.7 219 535 896 580 -316 
3041005 Fillets of salmon, fresh 772 3831 9.9 3059 2606 1893 2346 453 
3042002 Fillets of haddock,  frozen 626 119 -9.3 -508 -265 834 591 -243 
3042003 Fillets of cod, frozen 2282 488 -8.7 -1795 -580 3959 2744 -1215 
3042004 Fillets of coalfish, frozen 713 92 -11.4 -621 -352 1049 780 -269 
3042005 Fillets of herring, frozen 788 419 -3.7 -370 -294 1285 1210 -76 
3042010 Fillets of salmon, frozen 1007 2386 5.2 1379 1165 3123 3337 214 
Trade barriers or trade facilitators?  43 
HS8 classi-
fication 
Short description  
Export value 
(million 2013 NOK) Annual growth 
rate (%) 
Accumulated change in export (million 2013 NOK) 1996–2013 for: 
1996 2013 Exports 
Intensive margin (in-
cumbent exporters) 
Exit of 
firms 
Entry of 
firms 
Net entry or exit 
3053003 Salted fillets of herring 53 81 2.6 29 32 95 91 -3 
3053004 Salted fillets of cod 198 25 -11.5 -173 -34 550 411 -139 
3053005 Salted fillets of ling 29 45 2.7 16 -41 222 279 57 
3053008 Dried ling 90 25 -7.3 -65 -89 130 154 24 
3054100 Smoked salmon 309 192 -2.8 -117 -28 807 718 -89 
3054900 Smoked fish excl. salmon or herring 105 128 1.2 23 30 157 150 -7 
3055103 Smoked Lofoten round cod 523 403 -1.5 -120 -232 591 703 113 
3055107 Klipfish,  cod 2485 1578 -2.6 -907 -791 1937 1821 -116 
3055903 Klipfish,  coalfish 739 1200 2.9 461 235 941 1167 226 
3055905 Klipfish, tusk 288 131 -4.5 -157 -140 256 240 -16 
3055906 Klipfish, ling 276 105 -5.6 -172 -138 359 325 -34 
3056200 Cod, salted but not dried  1970 660 -6.2 -1309 -1055 2699 2445 -254 
3056902 Coalfish, salted but not dried  82 19 -8.2 -63 -133 395 465 71 
3061301 Raw shrimps, frozen 237 4 -20.9 -233 -60 910 738 -172 
3061302 Boiled shrimps, frozen 41 33 -1.2 -8 -30 371 393 22 
3061400 Crabs, frozen 17 138 13.2 121 4 376 493 118 
15042031 Herring oil and other fish oils for feed 373 643 3.3 270 175 991 1086 96 
15161020 Fish fats and oils, not for feed purposes 520 259 -4.0 -262 -490 1493 1721 229 
16041206 Prepared herring, vinegar-cured 57 172 6.7 114 69 49 95 46 
16041301 Sardines etc., smoked and preserved 194 1 -27.0 -193 -78 202 87 -115 
16042006 Sweet or salt cured roes, frozen 86 9 -12.4 -77 -21 227 172 -56 
16052001 Shrimps, shelled and frozen 997 3 -28.8 -994 -662 1359 1027 -332 
16052002 Shrimps, shelled and in brine 84 155 3.7 71 81 180 170 -10 
23012010 Flours, meals and pellets of fish, for feed 589 223 -5.5 -365 -696 1172 1502 331 
Sum 53 products 34100 57813 3.2 23713 23032 66940 67621 681 
Total seafood exports 38020 61879 2.9 
     
 Appendix 2. Detailed description of 
control variables 
tariffivt is taken from the MacMap database, which includes information 
on applied ad valorem tariffs against Norway for each importing coun-
try and product at the six-digit HS level.29 tariffivt is reported as 1 + the 
share, thus tariffivt = 1.01 reflects a one percent ad valorem tariff rate. 
In the data, tariffs for the new EU member states prior to their entry into 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 are erroneously set equal to the EU level.  
With the exception of Malta and Cyprus, Norway had free trade agree-
ments with these countries prior to their joining the EU, so we change 
their tariffs to zero.30, 31 eeait and ftait are taken from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. 32 The variables are set equal 
to 1 from year t and onwards if the FTA entered into force during the 
first half of year t, and 0 otherwise. impcostit is taken from the Doing 
Business database; data are available from year 2005.33 We set values 
prior to 2005 equal to the 2005 level. regqualit, gexchit, gdpit and cgdpit 
are provided by The World Bank’s Governance Indicators (WGI).34 
consit is taken from  the Food and Agriculture Organization of the Unit-
ed Nations (FAO).35 In the analysis presented in Table A7 we also in-
clude three time-invariant trade costs variables: a dummy for land-
locked countries (landlockedi), distance from Norway (disti), and aver-
age distance to the rest of the world (remotenessi).36 Data are taken 
from the CEPII database dist_cepii (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). For disti 
and remotenessi we use the Great Circle distance measured in kilome-
tres between largest cities (the disti variable). In the analyses, we take 
the natural logarithm of tariffivt, impcostit, gdpit, cgdpit, disti, and re-
motenessi.
                                                          
29  For a further description of the data, see 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=12  
30  Regression results are robust to other methods, such as not changing the rates set 
in the data.  
31  We exclude all other countries for which tariffs are lacking some years. 
32  http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nfd/selected-topics/free-trade/partner-
land.html?id=438843  
33  http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders 
34 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. WDI lacks data 
for gexchit for some countries, in which case we use data from the Central Bank of 
Norway instead. http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/exchange_rates/. gdpit 
and cgdpit are given in current NOK 
35 http://faostat.fao.org/site/610/default.aspx#ancor. 
36  remotensei is defined as 
1
1 n
ij
j
d
n 
 , where dji is distance from country i to country j, 
and n is the number of countries. Internal distance djj is set equal to the square root 
of the country’s area multiplied by about 0.4. 
 Appendix 3. Results from robustness checks from 
within regression 
A3. Including zero trade flows 
Variable exportivt extensiveivt intensiveivt 
spsivt-1 -0.337 -0.177*** -0.308** 
  (0.217) (0.054) (0.130) 
spsivt-1 * fresh 1.013*** 0.260*** 0.678*** 
  (0.358) (0.095) (0.223) 
tbtivt-1 -0.345*** -0.141*** -0.151* 
  (0.128) (0.038) (0.083) 
tbtivt-1 * fresh 0.522*** 0.128*** 0.394*** 
  (0.085) (0.040) (0.088) 
ln(tariffivt-1) -0.983 -0.640*** -0.623 
  (0.862) (0.179) (0.483) 
ftait 0.385** 0.210*** 0.133 
  (0.152) (0.074) (0.166) 
eeait 0.696** -0.091 0.357 
  (0.342) (0.104) (0.283) 
regqualit -0.112 0.035 -0.046 
  (0.151) (0.078) (0.204) 
ln (impcostsit) -0.645 -0.086 -0.263 
  (0.434) (0.191) (0.362) 
ln(gdpit) 2.901** 0.701*** 2.618** 
  (1.164) (0.173) (1.044) 
ln(cgdpit) -2.115* -0.172 -2.010** 
  (1.253) (0.171) (1.018) 
ln(consit) 0.577* 0.356*** -0.049 
  (0.304) (0.099) (0.194) 
gexchit -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
No obs 15,036 15,036 15,036 
No group 1,532 1,532 1,532 
Note: exportivt = export value of product v to country i, extensive ivt = num-
ber of firms exporting product v to country i, and intensiveivt = their average 
export value. Estimation method:  within/fixed effects poisson maximum 
likelihood (fixed effects at the country-product level). Year-dummies 
included, but not reported. Std. dev. in parentheses (cluster robust errors 
with clustering at country-product level). *, **, *** indicate significance 
level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 A4. Including leads of possible endogenous varia-
bles 
Variable ln (exportivt) ln (extensiveivt) ln (intensiveivt) 
spsivt-1 -0.333*** -0.168*** -0.165* 
  (0.127) (0.059) (0.087) 
spsivt-1 * fresh 0.582** 0.270*** 0.312 
  (0.282) (0.076) (0.240) 
tbtivt-1 -0.077 -0.054 -0.023 
  (0.091) (0.033) (0.082) 
tbtivt-1 * fresh 0.199 0.016 0.183 
  (0.147) (0.047) (0.141) 
ln(tariffivt-1) -1.000 -0.813** -0.187 
  (0.713) (0.364) (0.584) 
spsivt -0.047 -0.002 -0.045 
  (0.112) (0.053) (0.090) 
spsivt * fresh 0.357 0.037 0.319 
  (0.292) (0.071) (0.266) 
tbtivt -0.026 -0.048 0.022 
  (0.121) (0.040) (0.101) 
tbtivt * fresh 0.150 0.069 0.081 
  (0.203) (0.054) (0.179) 
ln(tariffivt) -0.531 0.214 -0.745 
  (0.815) (0.335) (0.673) 
ftait 0.356 0.138* 0.219 
  (0.241) (0.081) (0.171) 
eeait -0.112 -0.128 0.016 
  (0.275) (0.103) (0.207) 
regqualit 0.193 0.033 0.160 
  (0.187) (0.087) (0.164) 
ln(impcostsit) 0.027 -0.033 0.061 
  (0.501) (0.155) (0.460) 
ln(gdpit) 2.242*** 0.571** 1.671*** 
  (0.378) (0.246) (0.290) 
ln(cgdpit) -1.310*** -0.239 -1.072*** 
  (0.353) (0.249) (0.223) 
ln(consit) 0.189 0.282*** -0.093 
  (0.249) (0.097) (0.201) 
gexchit -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
constant -35.572*** -12.634*** -22.938*** 
  (7.314) (4.277) (5.527) 
No obs 7,545 7,545 7,545 
R2 0.041 0.098 0.046 
No group 1,532 1,532 1,532 
Note: exportivt = export value of product v to country i, extensive ivt = number of 
firms exporting product v to country i, and intensiveivt = their average export value. 
Estimation method:  within/fixed effects OLS (fixed effects at the country-product 
level). Year-dummies included, but not reported. Std. dev. in parentheses (cluster 
robust errors with clustering at country level). *, **, *** indicates significance level 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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A5. Excluding tariffs 
Variable 
ln (ex-
portivt) 
ln (exten-
siveivt) 
ln (inten-
siveivt) 
spsivt-1 -0.186** -0.106*** -0.080 
  (0.083) (0.027) (0.072) 
spsivt-1 * 
fresh 0.599*** 0.184*** 0.415** 
  (0.182) (0.051) (0.193) 
tbtivt-1 -0.109 -0.040* -0.070 
  (0.082) (0.024) (0.068) 
tbtivt-1 * 
fresh 0.148 -0.008 0.156** 
  (0.098) (0.042) (0.068) 
ftait 0.239 0.074 0.165 
  (0.170) (0.052) (0.126) 
eeait 0.009 -0.050 0.059 
  (0.160) (0.058) (0.134) 
regqualit 0.141 -0.017 0.159 
  (0.130) (0.058) (0.115) 
ln 
(impcostsit) -0.072 -0.071 -0.000 
  (0.365) (0.087) (0.348) 
ln(gdpit) 1.497*** 0.289*** 1.208*** 
  (0.303) (0.085) (0.330) 
ln(cgdpit) -0.743*** -0.000 -0.743** 
  (0.283) (0.085) (0.303) 
ln(consit) 0.342** 0.172*** 0.169 
 (0.144) (0.061) (0.127) 
gexchit -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
constant -21.514*** -7.054*** -14.459** 
  (5.559) (1.585) (5.706) 
No obs 25,948 25,948 25,948 
R2 0.016 0.039 0.019 
No group 5,738 5,738 5,738 
    
    
Note: exportivt = export value of product v to country i, 
extensive ivt = number of firms exporting product v to 
country i, and intensiveivt = their average export value.  
Estimation method:  within/fixed effects OLS (fixed effects 
at the country-product level). Year-dummies included, but 
not reported. Std. dev. in parentheses (cluster robust errors 
with clustering at country level). *, **, *** indicate signifi-
cance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
A6. Years 2002–2007 
Variable 
ln (ex-
portivt) 
ln (exten-
siveivt) 
ln (inten-
siveivt) 
spsivt-1 -0.466*** -0.210*** -0.256** 
 (0.131) (0.061) (0.104) 
spsivt-1 * 
fresh 0.772*** 0.303*** 0.469** 
 (0.212) (0.091) (0.188) 
tbtivt-1 -0.198* -0.126*** -0.072 
 (0.105) (0.039) (0.099) 
tbtivt-1 * 
fresh 0.329* 0.172*** 0.157 
 (0.180) (0.056) (0.158) 
ln (tariffivt-1) -1.660** -0.547*** -1.113 
 (0.755) (0.149) (0.739) 
ftait 0.461** 0.103 0.357 
 (0.229) (0.069) (0.232) 
eeait -0.052 -0.129 0.077 
 (0.272) (0.087) (0.266) 
regqualit -0.031 0.072 -0.103 
 (0.181) (0.068) (0.170) 
ln 
(impcostsit) -0.529 -0.122 -0.407 
 (0.794) (0.263) (0.655) 
ln(gdpit) 2.543*** 0.411 2.132*** 
 (0.907) (0.489) (0.540) 
ln(cgdpit) -1.498 -0.104 -1.394** 
 (0.956) (0.526) (0.606) 
ln(consit) 0.008 0.153 -0.145 
 (0.227) (0.120) (0.223) 
gexchit 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
constant -36.031** -8.492 -27.539** 
 (17.529) (8.609) (11.397) 
No obs 4,602 4,602 4,602 
R2 0.041 0.071 0.035 
No group 1,313 1,313 1,313 
Note: exportivt = export value of product v to country i, exten-
siveivt = number of firms exporting product v to country i, and 
intensiveivt = their average export value. Estimation method:  
within/fixed effects OLS (fixed effects at the country-product 
level). Year-dummies included, but not reported. Std. dev. in 
parentheses (cluster robust errors with clustering at country 
level). *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table A7. Testing for correlation between unobserved heterogeneity  
and the explanatory variables 
Variable 
ln (ex-
portivt) 
ln (exten-
siveivt) 
ln (inten-
siveivt) 
spsivt-1 -0.400*** -0.169*** -0.229*** 
  (0.111) (0.051) (0.087) 
mean spsiv -0.231 0.094 -0.343 
  (0.582) (0.164) (0.445) 
spsivt-1 * 
fresh 0.770*** 0.292*** 0.467** 
  (0.217) (0.066) (0.193) 
mean spsiv * 
fresh 0.824 0.019 0.829** 
  (0.529) (0.153) (0.418) 
tbtivt-1 -0.088 -0.079** -0.013 
  (0.103) (0.032) (0.091) 
mean tbtiv 0.279 0.015 0.264 
  (0.531) (0.141) (0.431) 
tbtivt-1 X 
fresh 0.305* 0.050 0.251* 
  (0.175) (0.046) (0.149) 
mean tbtiv * 
fresh -0.849 -0.110 -0.722 
  (0.673) (0.162) (0.547) 
ln (tariffivt-1) -1.599*** -0.645*** -0.967 
  (0.566) (0.162) (0.617) 
mean 
ln(tariffiv) 0.024 0.264 -0.220 
  (1.501) (0.421) (1.326) 
ftait 0.296 0.128 0.161 
  (0.254) (0.082) (0.187) 
mean ftai -0.285 -0.185 -0.073 
  (0.604) (0.146) (0.493) 
eeait -0.152 -0.141 -0.013 
  (0.240) (0.089) (0.188) 
mean eeai -0.073 -0.035 -0.043 
  (0.714) (0.199) (0.592) 
regqualit 0.248 0.058 0.183 
  (0.196) (0.088) (0.179) 
mean 
regquali -0.279 0.047 -0.326 
  (0.315) (0.127) (0.267) 
 
Variable 
ln (ex-
portivt) 
ln (exten-
siveivt) 
ln (inten-
siveivt) 
ln(impcostsit) 0.322 0.019 0.294 
  (0.509) (0.159) (0.437) 
mean 
ln(impcostsj) 0.749 0.272 0.491 
  (0.718) (0.217) (0.607) 
ln(gdpit) 2.054*** 0.516** 1.510*** 
  (0.348) (0.221) (0.271) 
mean ln(gdpi) -1.604*** -0.350 -1.220*** 
  (0.356) (0.218) (0.283) 
ln(cgdpit) -1.150*** -0.186 -0.933*** 
  (0.328) (0.220) (0.208) 
mean 
ln(cgdpi) 1.052*** 0.106 0.916*** 
  (0.393) (0.221) (0.260) 
ln(impcostsit) 0.120 0.261*** -0.152 
  (0.246) (0.090) (0.200) 
mean 
ln(impcostsi) 0.455 -0.152 0.625*** 
  (0.286) (0.100) (0.233) 
gexchit -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
mean gexchi -0.039 -0.006 -0.031 
  (0.029) (0.010) (0.025) 
remotenessi 1.748 0.466 1.301 
  (1.415) (0.389) (1.195) 
ln(disti) -1.318*** -0.518*** -0.808*** 
  (0.302) (0.082) (0.265) 
landlockedi -0.848*** -0.366*** -0.483** 
  (0.319) (0.112) (0.235) 
constant -12.792 -4.980 -8.102 
  (14.662) (3.809) (12.147) 
No obs 6,695 6,695 6,695 
No group 1,402 1,402 1,402 
 
 
Note: exportivt = export value of product v to country i, extensive ivt = number of firms exporting product v to country i, and intensiveivt = 
their average export value. Estimation method:  random effects (random effects at the country-product level). Year-dummies included, but 
not reported. Std. dev. in parentheses (cluster robust errors with clustering at country level). *, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
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